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SUMMARY 
An apparent contradiction is clearly observed in the area of development of regional 
infrastructure related to environmental protection between short-term adverse interests and 
the long-term interests connected to improving the quality of environment and the quality 
of life. Local governments in larger cities were quicker in realizing that prevention of 
environmental pollution offers serious advantages even in the mid-term, albeit at extra 
costs to be assumed in the period at hand. Those who managed to develop their regional 
programmes in time have made considerable progress by now, with development activities 
started, investment activities launched, and external funds acquired to finance the majority 
of implementation expenditures, thereby achieving significant savings for the population 
over the longer term. 
As an important task, operation that follows the regional development activities should be 
accomplished in the most efficient way possible. As a precondition, the integrated regional 
system of public services and the common intra-regional tariff system should be 
implemented. The former is to ensure the most efficient and least expensive operation 
based on aspects of economies of scale, the latter is to account for a fair distribution of the 
public burden. 
In the event of a failure to introduce the integrated regional system of public services and 
the common intra-regional tariff system, serious disturbance of operation, problems and 
tension are to be encountered between the local governments concerned, which may 
present a difficulty in operating the system and even make it inoperable. 
INTRODUCTION 
The process of catching up, including as one its major areas that of legal harmonization, 
commenced several years before the accession of Hungary to the European Union. 
Considerable lag was noted, among other areas, in environmental protection and, in 
particular, waste management. Without the albeit partial catching up with the said lag, we 
would have been left with hardly any chance of meeting the accession criteria. In the first 
phase, the national legal system was adapted to the requirements of the EU directives, 
actually, by the turn of the millennium. In order to facilitate accession, the Commission of 
the EU established a fund (ISPA) in its budget in 1998-1999 to support the candidate 
countries in their efforts to develop infrastructure mainly related to transport and 
environmental protection. 
Based on the ISPA project entitled the „Regional Waste Management Program of Szeged", 
I tried, in addition to dealing with current issues related to waste management, to analyze 
the tension situations and conflicts of the society which emerged sharply in the course of. 
preparation and implementation of domestic EU programmes between short-term and long-
term interests of various groups and which to date have not been solved in a favourable 
manner. 
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1. ADVERSE SHORT-TERM INTERESTS IN THE AREA OF WASTE 
MANAGEMENT 
In the short run, the society as a whole maintains adverse interests with respect to the 
implementation and provision of efficient and high quality environmental services. Simply 
put: the establishment and long-term continuous operation of an advanced infrastructure of 
environmental protection is extremely costly and, in economic terms, either clearly 
produces losses or grants a return only over a very long term. Considerable increase in 
public utility fees (public service related to canalization - waste water purification - waste 
management) entails dramatically higher costs of living for families, as well as short-term 
expenditures of the country. 
2. ADVANCED ENVIRONMENTAL MANAGEMENT IS A LONG-TERM INTEREST 
OF THE COUNTRY 
2.1./ Prevention of pollution and elimination of damage 
Maintaining a society which operates in a way that pollutes and destroys its environment 
may have unpredictable consequences that may bring with them, even in the mid-term, 
extra costs which by far surpass the expenses we may avoid by delaying the 
implementation of an advanced system of environmental protection. Notwithstanding the. 
diverse approaches offered by special literature, all researchers appear to share the view 
that the costs arising in the course of elimination of environmental pollution and also 
recultivation are by several magnitudes higher than those connected to the prevention of 
pollution. 
2.2./ „Unlimited" natural resources 
Contamination and continuous destruction of the natural resources, including clean air, 
clean water, soils, forests, and seas, the natural flora and fauna of the Earth, is a global 
process that is clearly manifest. What has been heretofore considered as a free and 
„unlimited natural resource" will soon be accessible only at a constantly growing price. 
This will entail, in the long run, a significant and unavoidable increase in production costs 
as a result of global pollution-related processes whose extent is impossible to estimate at 
the moment. At any rate, its rate will definitely be higher than the costs of prevention of 
pollution and elimination of damage. 
2.3./A national interest or a European interest ? 
In global terms, one can conclude that there is extreme interest in the implementation of an 
advanced system of environmental management that will have a favourable impact on the 
quality of the environment and the quality of life of the population of the regions 
concerned already in the short term. Member states of the European Union had realized 
this several decades ago, that is why they jointly elaborated one of the most advanced 
system of regulations and infrastructure related to environmental protection, i.e. the IPPC: 
Integrated Pollution Prevention and Control, which clearly stresses the importance of 
pollution prevention. The strict policy of the Union regarding competition under equal 
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terms between member states requires that the countries with recent accession to the EU 
establish an advanced infrastructure of environmental protection as soon as possible so as 
to prevent them from acquiring competitive advantage over other states through cutting 
back on costs pertaining to environmental protection. 
Often times it may appear that we are forced by the European Union to undertake costly 
investment in environmental protection. Of course, primarily, environmental protection is a 
national priority whose neglect would entail unforeseeable damage to the country not only 
,'n terms of its national values but also in terms of the national economy as a whole. A 
wrong decision made today may have an unfavourable impact on the quality of life and 
future prospects of those living here. 
2.4./Resolving conflicts of short-term adverse interests 
The stringent Hungarian legal provisions on environmental protection developed within the 
framework of law harmonization with the European Union have partly implemented 
administrative measures to eliminate conflicts resulting from adverse interests. Thos 
concerned, including the local governments, will be forced to establish a local 
infrastructure of environmental protection within a foreseeable period of time, otherwise 
they will have to pay considerable amounts of environmental protection penalty or, more 
recently and in certain areas, fees related to environmental load (environmental use). 
It is the responsibility of local governmental policy at the national and also local level -
first of all, that of the Hungarian political parties - to resolve conflicts of short-term 
adverse interests and gradually, yet at the fastest possible rate, establish a technical and 
technological background for environmental protection in Hungary in such a way that 
domestic and community resources are utilized in order to allow the process to be 
accomplished with minimum load. 
2.4./ Short-term adverse interests and project marketing 
Project marketing deals with the issue of assessing the impact of various interest groups on 
the implementation, result, and success of a project. Viewed from the angle of a project, an 
interest group represents any community organized on a single basis or operating as an 
organization whose members share nearly identical interests with respect to the 
implementation of the project or the operation of an outcome thus created. Interest groups 
may exhibit a supportive or a hostile attitude. 
Project marketing is a pro-active activity used by the investor not simply to "sell" his 
project, i.e., make the interest groups accept it, but also as a means promoting effective 
implementation of an establishment by way of making apparent the emotions and 
expectations of the interest groups concerning the establishment. Thus it allows the 
management responsible for project supervision to avoid unnecessary conflicts by 
satisfying reasonable and legally appropriate demands, on the one hand, and providing 
targeted and authentic information, on the other hand, which in turn increases readiness of 
the interest groups to provide support. 
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3. THE MARKET OF SERVICES RELATED TO ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION 
A large number of enterprises active in the area of environmental protection came to life 
following the change of the regime. The large number of competitors triggered fierce price 
competition and many actors were forced to undertake work at costs below those actually 
incurring in order to survive. As a result, the market of services related to environmental 
protection became one of the sectors representing the largest environmental risk. Cases of 
considerable abuse were noted especially in one of the newest areas of the field, i.e., the 
treatment of hazardous wastes. There is a large number of cases which demonstrate that a 
free market and an unbounded price competition result in dramatic increase in 
environmental risks and direct environmental pollution. 
An entrepreneur can realize extra profits regardless of his low prices in case he reduces 
transportation distances, on the one hand, and environmental protection costs, on the other 
hand, by depositing waste at the nearest out-of-the-way location, green belt around the city, 
or an illegal disposal site established in a small nearby forest („illegal dumping ground"). It 
goes without saying that such deeds have unpredictable social consequences and 
environmental damage. In summary, it can be stated that exposure of environmental 
protection to the law of the market leads to direct environmental pollution as a result of 
unreasonable price competition and globally deprives the sector of considerable resources 
of development. 
4. THE REGIONAL WASTE MANAGEMENT PROJECT OF THE EUROPEAN 
UNION 
The given programme is oriented toward the establishment of a safe regional waste 
management system that is to be accomplished completely with biogas utilization, 
selection and collection of recyclable wastes, treatment of wastes to be recycled for 
composting, and re-utilization of building and demolishing wastes. As a result, 
considerable decrease in environmental pollution can be achieved, with the added benefit 
of lower amounts of wastes to be deposited on the landfill. Costs incurring relative to the 
sector may be diminished through the sale of recyclable wastes, which, in turn, will lead to 
significant improvement in the area of cost efficiency. 
The development activities within the ISPA project, with a budget of more than HUF 7 
billion (28 million euros) prepared on the basis of a concept design elaborated earlier 
include the following: 
5. COOPERATION OF LOCAL GOVERNMENTS IN THE AREA OF WASTE 
MANAGEMENT 
Unfortunately, there are no deep-rooted traditions of regional cooperation based on 
volunteer participation in Hungary. The forced relations that were upheld in the earlier 
period automatically came to an end at the time of the change of the regime. Today, 
personal aversion and total lack of confidence appear largely accepted and typical in 
national and local politics and various forums of publicity. It is impossible to acquire 
community funding and assistance without regional cooperation. Therefore, an interesting 
phenomenon has evolved in Hungary. 
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Project regions have gradually emerged where real or presumed conflicts of interests, 
harms and even personal aversion have been temporarily put aside for the sake of making 
joint efforts to ensure access to support opportunities. Such cooperation activities resemble 
those of the period before the change of the regime in that they, too, have the character of 
forced relations, rather than evolve on the basis of discovering mutual benefits of regional 
cooperation. With the expiry of support agreements, earlier tension is expected to come to 
the surface again, leading to termination of cooperation and division of the assets acquired 
together in accordance with the relevant bargain made earlier. 
5.1./ The relation between the local governments of the city and the small settlements 
The relation between Szeged and the surrounding settlements is far from being ideal. 
Owing to the particular mechanisms of resource allocation used in the period of socialism, 
considerable tension had accumulated between the local government of the county seat and 
the smaller municipalities of the county. The county seat used to receive far more central 
subsidy (that was where the majority of county leaders lived). The smaller settlements 
around Szeged felt like being subjected to real oppression compared with the city. The 
same holds for the other major cities of the county. 
5.2./Setting up a consortium (33 settlements, 250 thousand inhabitants) 
When the objectives and the system of criteria related to the ISPA programme were 
revealed, it was apparent that chances for a success were scarce without regional 
cooperation. The foundation of the regional programme was derived from the waste 
management concept for Csongrád county elaborated by the waste management service 
provider of Szeged, i. e., the Waste Management Public Benefit Company of Szeged. At 
the time of preparing the ISPA programme, the concept was modified in such a way that 
the earlier concept aimed at county level cooperation was reduced to cooperation of about 
thirty settlements because that was the size which corresponded to the population of 
250,000 inhabitants as foreseen in the community directives then in force. According to 
calculations pertaining to economies of scale, that was the size which allowed for reduction 
of unit costs to an optimal level. The major difficulty encountered in this respect was to 
persuade the large number of local governments to join the consortium. 
5.3 / Consortial Agreemen t 
Pursuant to the Consortial Agreement, the local authorities signing the agreement agreed to 
cooperate in finding a mutual solution to the waste management problems faced in the 
region, and act jointly in order to utilize various opportunities for support. The Local 
Government of Szeged, a City of County Rank, is the host organization that represents the 
Consortium, with the public services provider of the local government, i.e., the Waste 
Management Public Benefit Company of Szeged, acting on its behalf. 
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5.4J Equitable distribution of the public burden and local politics 
At the time of drawing up the Consortial Agreement, the local governments of the 
surrounding settlements insisted on the agreement being free from any stipulation 
assigning the assumption of concrete liabilities to them. Abusing the need to cooperate, 
they blackmailed Szeged by stating their reluctance to sign the Consortial Agreement in 
case it contained any provision obliging them to effect payment. As a result, the local 
government of Szeged was forced to assume all costs related to the preparation of the 
entire development programme and also to secure own municipality resources required for 
implementation. This was accomplished in such a way that the local government of Szeged 
undertook, at the time of submitting the project documentation, to increase the fee charged 
for waste management public services by an annual rate of 10% above inflation, over a 
period of 7 years from 2000, and use the extra revenue thus derived to finance the required 
own resources of the local government as well as the extra costs of operation to be 
assumed after the investment is completed. 
The given arrangement offers considerable benefits for Szeged, as the amount of own 
resources will be considerably lower than 10% at the time of completion, and the city of 
Szeged will receive in exchange the ownership rights of the whole public service assets 
created in the course of development. As far as operation is concerned, however, 
significant tension is expected to emerge. The other settlements of the Consortium, of 
course, did not increase the fees for public services at a rate comparable to that of Szeged, 
the actual rates were commensurate with the rate of inflation as a maximum. Therefore, the 
rates collected at present in Szeged amount to nearly double the rate of the rest of the 
region. 
During the period of investment and with the given shaping of ownership relations, this 
difference does not represent a problem. In the period following implementation, that is, 
the period of operation, on the other hand, the rates collected for public services in Szeged 
clearly cannot be expected to cover the higher costs of the regional waste management 
system alone. 
6 . L O N G - T E R M C O O P E R A T I O N 
6.1/Operation of the facilities created within the project 
The facilities created within the project will become property of Szeged, a City of County 
Rank, their operation will be task of the waste management service provider of Szeged, 
the Waste Management Public Benefit Company of Szeged. While this solution will 
present no particular problems regarding the operation of the central facilities, disturbances 
may be expected in operating the network of waste-yards and waste collection islands. In 
the event that the planned integrated regional system of public services is implemented — 
which is also foreseen in the Consortial Agreement — such disturbance in operation may 
be negligible and a long term solution will be found for the issue of regional financing 
along with distribution of the public burden in proportion with the system. An important 
objective of the uniform system of public services is to implement a common intra-
regional tariff system which represents a prerequisite for fair distribution of the public 
burden. 
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6.2J Integrated regional system of public services 
The scales of operation also preferred by the European Union ensure that a regional waste 
management system is operated with the smallest unit costs, while maintaining an 
acceptable level of efficiency. Based on the Consortial Agreement, chances are favourable 
for the establishment of the proposed integrated regional system of public services, which 
is aimed, among other objectives, at implementing a common intra-regional tariff system. 
The common tariff system is a precondition for a fair distribution of the public burden 
because existing disproportion prevents the population of the region from assuming public 
burden in a uniform and proportionate way. This objective will have to be achieved, 
according to a well-designed programme prepared in advance, within a period of 5 years, 
but in any case by not later than 2011. 
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